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I. INTRODUCTIONCRIMINAL defense attorneys raised Miranda warning issues since
the Supreme Court decided the now-famous case of Miranda v.
Arizona nearly fifty years ago.' Surprisingly, our nation's law en-
forcement officers (with the help of the courts) have created a great deal
of chaos in what should be a simple task: advising in-custody suspects that
they have the right to remain silent; that anything they say can be used
against them; that they have the right to an attorney before and during
questioning; that if they cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed
for them; and that if they choose to speak, they can stop answering ques-
tions at any time.2
What is not surprising is that these decades of litigation have resulted
in a great deal of scholarship on the Miranda warning. The bulk of this
scholarship has focused not on the warning's language, but rather on Mi-
randa's long, perplexing, and often nonsensical history, the Fifth Amend-
ment theory underlying the Miranda rights, the importance to society of
fair play by the police, and even Miranda's importance in protecting sus-
pects against false confessions.
This Article, however, will not rehash these subjects, which other au-
thors have covered more than adequately. Instead, this Article focuses
on the Miranda warning itself. That is, instead of debating the proper
scope or interpretation of the underlying Miranda rights, this Article asks
whether the Miranda warning conveys those rights accurately, com-
pletely, and in a way that suspects can easily understand. Further, it ex-
plores whether a suspect who wishes to invoke one or more of the rights
is actually able to do so-after all, a theoretical right that cannot be exer-
cised is meaningless. Unfortunately, the answer to all of the above ques-
tions is a resounding no. Consequently, this Article proposes a new
Miranda warning.
Part II of this Article examines the language of the current Miranda
warning-something that is easier said than done, given that courts per-
mit hundreds of variations from the original warning, often changing its
substance in the process.3 This leads to Part III, which demonstrates that
these multiple iterations of the Miranda warning are utterly incompre-
hensible (even to judges), inaccurate, and incomplete when describing
Miranda's underlying rights.4 Part III also demonstrates that, due to the
so-called clear-statement rule, courts have made the right to silence and
the right to an attorney nearly impossible for suspects to actually invoke;
instead, the police easily circumvent these important rights.5
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. Id. at 444-45.
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Parts II.A.-III.C.
5. See infra Parts III.D.-III.E.
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Part IV then concedes that given the repeated abuses of Miranda by
the police and the courts' unwillingness to recognize our Fifth Amend-
ment rights, the best solution would be to require the presence of defense
counsel prior to any interrogation by the police.6 However, given that
this reform is unlikely to occur, Part V advocates for a more modest and
realistic solution: rewriting the Miranda warning. Part V sets out the
objectives for rewriting the warning-specifically, making the warning
understandable, accurate, and complete, while simultaneously giving sus-
pects a way to actually invoke the underlying rights.7 Further, these
objectives can only be accomplished by delivering the warning in a tiered
format, accounting for the contingent nature and staggered timing of the
underlying rights that the warning is designed to convey.8 Part VI then
presents the revamped Miranda warning, including a set of clear instruc-
tions for how the police must present it to criminal suspects. 9 Part VII
raises other important Miranda-related issues to be considered in the
context of the new warning.x0
II. THE MIRANDA WARNING-ANYTHING GOES
A prerequisite to criticizing (and then rewriting) the Miranda warning
is examining the actual language of the warning as it currently exists.
Before the police may interrogate an in-custody suspect-both interroga-
tion and custody are necessary to even trigger the need for the warning-
they must first inform the suspect that "he has the right to remain si-
lent";" that "anything said can and will be used against [him] in court;"12
that he has the "right to consult with counsel prior to questioning" and
"to have counsel present during any questioning";13 and that "if he is
indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him." 14
The Court held that these individual warnings, collectively referred to
as the Miranda warning, must be "clear and unequivocal."15 In the de-
cades following the Miranda decision, however, the Court permitted law
enforcement officers to change the warning to their liking.' 6 Initially, this
rule of deviation was one of substance over form; deviation from Mi-
randa's text would only be permitted so long as the warning "reasonably
conveyed" the substance of the underlying rights.17 As more time passed,
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra Part V.B.
8. See infra Part V.C.
9. See infra Part VI.
10. See infra Part VII.
11. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966).
12. Id. at 469.
13. Id. at 470.
14. Id. at 473.
15. Id. at 467-68.
16. David B. Altman, Note, Fifth Amendment-Coercion and Clarity: The Supreme
Court Approves Altered Miranda Warnings, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1086, 1091-92
(1990).
17. Id. at 1103 (discussing Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989)).
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however, the rule of deviation morphed into what would more accurately
be described as the rule of "anything goes." In fact, we have now seen
"an unconstrained proliferation of warnings." 18  "One study found as
many [as] 900 different variations of Miranda warnings in use." 19
These multiple variations of the warning-some of which are discussed
in Part 111-are not merely minor changes from the original; rather,
"large differences exist in the nature of the warnings, their words, their
length, their cognitive complexity and indeed their very subject matter."20
Despite the Court's insistence that the substance of "[t]he four warnings
Miranda requires [is] invariable," 21 nothing could be further from the
truth. The reality is that lower courts have created "countless exceptions
and loopholes" to label nearly any imaginable version of the warning as
legally adequate-even if it miserably fails to convey anything resembling
Miranda's substance. 22
This anything-goes approach to Miranda has burdened the courts with
an unimaginable amount of litigation. Trial and appellate judges are
overwhelmed with deciding, on a case-by-case and fact-by-fact basis,
whether law enforcement officials adequately conveyed suspects' Mi-
randa rights and, in the case of appellate judges, whether erroneously
admitted statements require reversal of convictions. 23 This comes with a
staggering price tag-both financial and nonfinancial-for our system of
criminal justice. "The energy and expense expended in fighting and adju-
dicating these various iterations of Miranda texts and warnings is entirely
unnecessary. Moreover, unclear or illegal warnings defeat the law en-
forcement goal of achieving legally effective interrogation and convicting
the guilty. The entire matter seems easily curable and remarkably
wasteful." 2 4
18. Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1590 (2008).
19. D. Christopher Dearborn, "You Have the Right to an Attorney," but Not Right
Now: Combating Miranda's Failure by Advancing the Point of Attachment Under Article
XII of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 359, 374 (2011)
(case name set in plain text in original).
20. William F. Jung, Not Dead Yet: The Enduring Miranda Rule 25 Years After the
Supreme Court's October Term 1984, 28 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 447, 457 (2009); see
also Illan M. Romano, Note and Comment, Is Miranda on the Verge of Extinction? The
Supreme Court Loosens Miranda's Grip in Favor of Law Enforcement, 35 NOVA L. REV.
525, 543 (2011) ("Problems arising from Miranda stem from the complete lack of uniform-
ity in procedures and enforcement across jurisdictions." (case name set in plain text in
original)).
21. Florida v. Powell, 130 S.Ct. 1195, 1204 (2010).
22. Romano, supra note 20, at 543.
23. Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to
Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1826, 1844 (1987) (discussing "the time-consuming
appellate review of Miranda issues"); Adam S. Bazelon, Comment, Adding (or Reaffirm-
ing) a Temporal Element to the Miranda Warning "You Have the Right to an Attorney", 90
MARO. L. REV. 1009, 1040 (2007) (discussing the "fact-intensive inquiry" and its negative
impact on "judicial economy"); Daniel J. Croxall, Comment, Inferring Uniformity: To-
wards Deduction and Certainty in the Miranda Context, 39 McGEORGE L. REV. 1025, 1042
(2008) ("A uniform and specific Miranda warning could help alleviate some court conges-
tion." (case name set in plain text in original)).
24. Jung, supra note 20, at 457 (case name set in plain text in original).
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Indeed, the current state of affairs is easily curable-that is the purpose
of this Article-and courts even acknowledge this fact. Judges have con-
ceded that using uniform language would dramatically curtail litigation;
however, true to their practice of resisting consistency and clarity, courts
will only "encourage" or "recommend[ ]," rather than require, such
uniformity.25
Yet court-clogging litigation is the least of the problems. Far more sig-
nificantly, our Fifth Amendment rights have been reduced to shambles.
As Part III demonstrates, the various iterations of the Miranda warning
are usually incomprehensible to most suspects, always factually false in at
least one major respect, and woefully incomplete with regard to the im-
portant, underlying rights they purport to convey. Further, no version of
the warning provides a means by which a suspect may actually invoke the
underlying rights; rather, even minimally skilled police officers easily cir-
cumvent these rights-often with the help of prosecutors and judges later
in the courtroom.
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH THE WARNING
The goal of Miranda was to provide a warning that is comprehensible,
accurate, complete, and meaningful, and that can actually be invoked by
suspects who wish to do so. As explained below, the Miranda warning
fails miserably in all respects.
A. INCOMPREHENSIBLE: MAKING HEADS OR TAILS OF IT ALL
The various iterations of Miranda "vary remarkably in their length,
complexity, and comprehensibility" and range from sixty to three hun-
dred words. 26 "Worst of all are the warnings that are long, complex, and
obscure a suspect's Miranda rights." 27 In fact, even our Supreme Court
Justices cannot agree on the meaning of many of the warnings. 28
Take, for example, Duckworth v. Eagan, where the police advised the
suspect, "You have a right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask
you any questions, and to have him with you during questioning." 29
While this seems clear enough, the police then continued with their ver-
sion of the warning and stated: "We have no way of giving you a lawyer,
but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to
court."30
25. Croxall, supra note 23, at 1034 (citing United States v. Tillman, 963 F.2d 137,
141-42 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Noti, 731 F.2d 610, 615 (9th Cir. 1984)).
26. Richard Rogers et al., An Analysis of Miranda Warnings and Waivers: Comprehen-
sion and Coverage, 31 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 177, 189 (2007).
27. Brenda L. Rosales, Note, The Impact of Berghuis v. Thompkins on the Eroding
Miranda Warnings and Limited-English Proficient Individuals: You Must Speak Up to Re-
main Silent, 9 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 109, 123 (2012) (case name set in plain text
in original).
28. See, e.g., Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989).




These contradictory warnings would raise several questions from a sus-
pect, including: Do I have the right to a lawyer before and during ques-
tioning, or not? If I do not have that right, why did you first tell me that I
do? If I do have that right and decide to invoke it, but you cannot give
me access to the lawyer, what happens then? Will the interrogation con-
tinue? You said "if" I go to court; who decides whether I will go to court
and, if I do go, when will I go? If I will not be going to court, how long
will I remain locked up? Can I get out of jail sooner if I decide to talk to
you now? If I go to court and then get the lawyer, will you still want to
talk to me after I am charged and represented?
Even the Court could not agree on the answers to these and other
questions. The majority of Justices believed it was obvious that without
the availability of a lawyer, the suspect's invocation of the right to counsel
would serve to put an end to the police interrogation, thereby effectively
invoking his right to silence instead.3 1 This is a curious conclusion, as the
right to have an attorney present during questioning and the right to re-
main silent are two dramatically different rights. The four dissenting Jus-
tices believed that the self-contradictory warning left too many
unanswered questions and created new ones in the process. The dissent
speculated that:
[T]elling [the suspect] that appointed counsel could only be obtained
if and when he went to court, could have led [him] to believe that he
did not have the right to an attorney before interrogation if he could
not afford to hire one on his own. [He] may have believed that he
was not entitled to an attorney until he went to trial, or if he was not
taken to court, that he would not be entitled to an attorney at all.3 2
Further, the dissent argued that:
[T]he majority ignored the fact that the warnings are most likely to
be given to "frightened suspects unlettered in law, not legal experts
schooled in interpreting legal or semantic nuance." These people
would be less likely to properly understand the warnings than would
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or other people with exten-
sive legal training and experience. Therefore, since the warnings in
question can be easily misunderstood by laymen, they are
defective.33
Indeed, the mere fact that the Supreme Court split 5-4 on the meaning
of this internally inconsistent set of warnings necessarily proves the point:
It is incomprehensible. And even internally consistent sets of warnings
can be highly problematic for the non-Supreme Court jurists among us.
"The evidence proves many warnings demand a 'greater educational
background than many suspects possess.' "34 Often, the warnings that law
31. Id. at 204.
32. Altman, supra note 16, at 1096 (footnotes omitted) (citing Duckworth, 492 U.S. at
285-93).
33. Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 216 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)).
34. Dearborn, supra note 19, at 374 (quoting Weisselberg, supra note 18, at 1577).
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enforcement employees "require at least a tenth-grade reading level,"
while "one 2003 study found that seventy percent of inmates read at a
sixth grade level or below."35 And even the most educated among us
routinely fail to comprehend Miranda: "[S]ixty-four percent of college
students displayed two or more fundamental errors in their understand-
ing of the warnings."36
Finally, there is also the problem that a large percentage of criminal
suspects is comprised not of educated jurists, or of college students, or
even of individuals with sixth-grade reading levels. Rather, many crimi-
nal suspects are mentally ill, speak a first language other than English,
speak little or no English at all, or are juveniles.37 It is, therefore, no
wonder that after hearing these convoluted Miranda warnings, suspects
typically misunderstand their rights.
B. INACCURATE: I THOUGHT YOU SAID I COULD REMAIN SILENT?
Perhaps the biggest problem with the Miranda warning is that, even
when read verbatim from the Court's Miranda decision, it grossly mis-
states the nature of a suspect's right to remain silent. While this aspect of
the warning was accurate at the time of the Miranda decision, times have
changed-but the warning has not.
In its Miranda decision, the Court was not completely clear on what
would constitute a waiver of the right to remain silent, but it was com-
pletely clear on what would not constitute a waiver:
An express statement that the individual is willing to make a state-
ment and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement
could constitute a waiver. But a valid waiver will not be presumed
simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or
simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained
.... "Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible."38
Today, however, remaining silent is no longer an acceptable way to ex-
ercise the right to remain silent. In Berghuis v. Thompkins, the police
read the suspect the Miranda warning, and then gave him "repeated invi-
tations to tell his side of the story." 39 Despite this, the suspect "refus[ed]
to sign even an acknowledgment that he understood his Miranda rights"40
and then "was silent for two hours and forty-five minutes" before finally
35. Id. at 374-75.
36. Id. at 375.
37. Id. (discussing the comprehension by "vulnerable populations, including juveniles,
the disabled, and individuals for whom English is not their first language"); see also Sandra
Guerra Thompson, Evading Miranda: How Seibert and Patane Failed to "Save" Miranda,
40 VAL. U. L. REV. 645, 660 (2006) (discussing comprehension by "persons with low intelli-
gence or mental problems, juveniles, persons whose native language is not English, and
deaf defendants").
38. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (quoting Carnley v. Cochran, 369
U.S. 506, 516 (1962)).
39. 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2258-59 (2010).
40. Id. at 2270 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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answering a question.4 1 The Court held that the suspect's answer was
admissible against him at trial because he "did not say that he wanted to
remain silent or that he did not want to talk with the police." 42 More to
the point, he ironically waived the right to remain silent by remaining
silent.4 3
It is true that Berghuis was wrongly decided-"What in the world must
an individual do to exercise his constitutional right to remain silent be-
yond actually, in fact, remaining silent?" 4 4-but that is not the point.
Rather, the point is that telling a suspect that he has the right to remain
silent is no longer accurate. Today, "a suspect who wishes to guard his
right to remain silent against such a finding of 'waiver' must, counterin-
tuitively, speak-and must do so with sufficient precision to satisfy a
clear-statement rule that construes ambiguity in favor of the police." 4 5
Therefore, "the current warnings are not up-to-date because they fail to
adequately apprise suspects of all the applicable rights and prophylactic
rules of custodial interrogation, some of which were not recognized until
after the warnings were originally crafted." 46
The warning is inaccurate in other important ways as well. For exam-
ple, notwithstanding the example in Part III, most of the hundreds of
iterations of the warning do clearly advise the suspect that he may consult
with a lawyer before and have the lawyer present during any question-
ing.4 7 The idea behind having a lawyer present during questioning is a
good one, at least in theory:
The presence of counsel at the interrogation may serve several signif-
icant subsidiary functions as well. If the accused decides to talk to
his interrogators, the assistance of counsel can mitigate the dangers
of untrustworthiness. With a lawyer present the likelihood that the
police will practice coercion is reduced, and if coercion is neverthe-
less exercised the lawyer can testify to it in court. The presence of a
lawyer can also help to guarantee that . . . the statement is rightly
reported by the prosecution at trial.4 8
41. Id. at 2258 (majority opinion).
42. Id. at 2260.
43. Stephen Rushin, Comment, Rethinking Miranda: The Post-Arrest Right to Silence,
99 CALIF. L. REV. 151, 156 (2011) (asking how a court can "presume that a person waived
his right to silence when he remained generally silent for multiple hours in the face of
continuous questioning").
44. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2276 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Soffar v. Cockrell,
300 F.3d 588, 603 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (DeMoss, J., dissenting)).
45. Id. at 2266 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). While the clear-statement rule will be ad-
dressed later, it is sufficient to state here that the rule actually makes it quite difficult to
invoke the underlying rights, such as the right to an attorney and, now, even the right to
remain silent. For now, however, the world has changed, but the Miranda warning has not
changed with it.
46. Mark A. Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda Warnings in Light of Contemporary
Law and Understandings, 90 MINN. L. REV. 781, 817 (2006).
47. Ogletree, supra note 23, at 1826.
48. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470 (1966).
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However, unlike the warning about the right to remain silent-which
at one time was true but became false as the underlying law changed-
the warning about the right to an attorney before or during questioning
was never true.49 "In the vast majority of interrogations in which a sus-
pect invokes her right to counsel, no attorney is provided."50 Moreover,
"the 'right' guarantees neither access to a lawyer to explain the procedu-
ral complexities of a criminal case, nor unbiased, professional advice on
whether it is prudent to waive any constitutional protections. Rather, Mi-
randa only guarantees the right, once affirmatively invoked, to not be
asked questions by the police .... ."51
So, in reality, there is no on-call stationhouse defense lawyer, nor are
the police obligated, despite the language of the warning, to rustle up a
lawyer with whom the suspect may consult before deciding whether to
speak to police. This inaccuracy stems not from changes in the law over
time, but rather from the Miranda Court's gross misunderstanding about
how the warning "would operate in the real world."5 2
Miranda warnings are often inaccurate in other ways as well, largely
because courts tolerate so many deviations from the original warning.
For example, law enforcement will often tell a suspect that his statement
can be used "for or against him in a court of law," rather than merely
warning him that the statement can be used against him, as required by
Miranda.53 Obviously, informing a suspect that his statement might be
used in his defense at trial provides a strong inducement to speak, espe-
cially when coupled with the reasonable assumption that the alterna-
tive-invoking the right to remain silent-is strong evidence of guilt.5 4
The problem, however, is that this version of the warning, although
now court approved, is false. A defendant may not introduce his own
statement as evidence at trial; the rule against hearsay would bar it.55
Only the rarest of circumstances would permit the defendant to use his
own statement, and even then such use would likely be contingent on
other events. 5 6 While the state could introduce the defendant's self-serv-
ing statement into evidence as a statement of a party-opponent,57 it obvi-
ously has no interest in doing so. The prosecutor's goal is to convict the
defendant at trial, not to use exculpatory evidence to acquit him. But
despite the blatant falsity of the warning, courts have upheld this con-
49. Dearborn, supra note 19, at 360.
50. Godsey, supra note 46, at 797.
51. Dearborn, supra note 19, at 359 (footnote omitted) (case name set in plain text in
original).
52. Godsey, supra note 46, at 797.
53. McClellan v. State, 193 N.W.2d 711, 715 (Wis. 1972) (emphasis added).
54. See infra Part III.C.
55. See FED. R. EVID. 802.
56. See, e.g., State v. Lenarchick, 247 N.W.2d 80, 91 (Wis. 1976) ("Because the state
submitted the police officer's version of the confession . . . the defendant should have been
permitted the opportunity to rebut with his version of the conversation.
57. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) & advisory committee's note.
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torted version of it and any subsequently induced waiver of rights as le-
gally valid.58
C. INCOMPLETE: IT'S NOT WHAT YOU SAID; IT'S WHAT
You DIDN'T SAY
One of the biggest problems with the Miranda warning is not the infor-
mation it contains, but rather the information it omits. Although most
versions of the warning clearly inform the suspect that any statement he
makes can be used against him, no version of the warning tells the suspect
whether his refusal to speak can be used against him.5 9 Police interroga-
tion training manuals take full advantage of the warning's incompleteness
and sometimes encourage officers to thwart possible invocations of the
right to remain silent by telling suspects the following:
[Y]ou have the right to remain silent. That's your privilege and I'm
the last person in the world who'll try to take it away from you. If
that's the way you want to leave this, O.K. But let me ask you this.
Suppose you were in my shoes and I were in yours and you called me
in to ask me about this and I told you, "I don't want to answer any of
your questions." You'd think I had something to hide, and you'd
probably be right in thinking that. That's exactly what I'll have to
think about you, and so will everybody else. So let's sit here and talk
this whole thing over.60
Even without this not-so-subtle form of persuasion by law enforce-
ment, "many suspects naturally believe, albeit incorrectly, that remaining
silent will make them 'look guilty' and will be used against them as evi-
dence of guilt." 61 Of course, the opposite is true: post-Miranda silence is
generally not admissible as evidence of guilt.6 2 As a result, because of
what the warning does not say, "suspects are only partially informed of
the legal consequences of their choice to speak or remain silent."63
58. See State v. Melvin, 319 A.2d 450, 457 (N.J. 1974); Quinn v. State, 183 N.W.2d 64,
68 (Wis. 1971).
59. Godsey, supra note 46, at 802.
60. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 454 (1966) (citing FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E.
REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 111 (1962)).
61. Godsey, supra note 46, at 793; see also Marcy Strauss, The Sounds of Silence: Re-
considering the Invocation of the Right to Remain Silent Under Miranda, 17 WM. & MARY
BILL RTs. J. 773, 807-08 (2009) ([suspects] "are never told that if they do not talk, that
failure to cooperate cannot be used against them. Thus, some individuals might be tenta-
tive in requesting their rights out of fear that this assertion will actually harm them or be
construed in an adverse manner.").
62. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-19 (1976). Of course, the courts have carved
exceptions to the general rule so that prosecutors are able to use defendants' silence
against them at trial. See Rushin, supra note 43, at 163-64 (discussing the use of a suspect's
silence after he has initially waived his right to remain silent, but then attempts to invoke
it); Thompson, supra note 37, at 647 (discussing police tactics of delaying issuance of Mi-
randa in order to obtain pre-Miranda silence, which can be used at trial); Joshua I. Ham-
mack, Note, Turning Miranda Right Side Up: Post-Waiver Invocations and the Need to
Update the Miranda Warnings, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 421, 440 (discussing the use of a
suspect's silence after he has initially waived his right to remain silent, but then attempts to
invoke it).
63. Godsey, supra note 46, at 802.
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But if suspects are entitled to "know the consequences of speaking,
then it is equally essential, if not more so, that they also know that no
formal consequences will follow from their silence, and that they can ex-
ercise that right without penalty." 6 4 Otherwise, it is impossible for sus-
pects to make an informed decision about whether to waive or invoke the
right. In this same vein, the warning also fails to inform a suspect
whether his verbal request for an attorney-which, unlike silence, actu-
ally falls squarely within the category of "anything you say"-could later
be used against him as evidence of guilt.6 5 Once again, incomplete infor-
mation leads to uninformed decisions.
Some other versions of the warning are incomplete because they fail to
include information about another important right: Even if a suspect
starts to answer questions, he may stop answering them at any time. This
fundamental right, recognized and discussed in the Miranda decision it-
self, 6 6 is incredibly important in light of the bait-and-switch tactics often
used by police. For example, the police may induce a suspect to waive his
Miranda rights and talk about a pretextual matter that is completely un-
related to the alleged crime. But then, after the suspect begins talking,
the police may switch the topic to the alleged crime, which is the real
reason the police started interrogating the suspect in the first place. 6 7
Under these circumstances, understanding the right to stop answering
questions midstream, even after the police initially induced a waiver of
the right to remain silent, is critical.
Omitting this right-the right to stop answering questions at any time,
even after the suspect starts to talk-is often justified based on the timing
of when the right could be exercised: "The right to stop answering ques-
tions surfaces, not at the warnings stage of the Miranda safeguards, but
rather subsequent thereto ... ."68 While this does not justify omitting this
important right from the warning, it does make a legitimate observation
about the timing of the various Miranda rights: A suspect cannot exercise
the right to stop answering questions unless he first waives the right to
remain silent. Part VI explores this basic concept in greater detail, as it is
critical to rewriting the Miranda warning in an effective and workable
manner.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 794.
66. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966) ("The mere fact that he may have
answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him
of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an
attorney . . . .").
67. Ogletree, supra note 23, at 1841 ("[T]he police may question a suspect about a
more serious crime after she waives her right to silence with regard to a different, lesser
offense. . . ."); Weisselberg, supra note 18, at 1564 ("Police do not have to tell a suspect the
subject matter of an investigation .... ).
68. State v. Mitchell, 482 N.W.2d 364, 372 (Wis. 1992).
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D. DIFFICULT TO INVOKE: CAN I PLEASE HAVE
THAT LAWYER Now?
While the rights underlying Miranda are incredibly important, the
Court's complete disdain for structure and clarity has made trying to in-
voke those rights an exercise in futility. Specifically, the warnings do not
provide any guidance on how to actually invoke the rights they purport to
convey. 69 Further, law enforcement officers have no incentive to provide
such guidance, as doing so would be completely contrary to their own
interests. 70
To make matters worse, law enforcement will often provide only one
option to suspects: to waive, rather than invoke, their rights.7 1 For exam-
ple, the Quincy, Massachusetts Police Department uses a written form
that enumerates the Miranda warnings and then gives the suspect only
one choice: "[D]o you now waive your Fifth Amendment Rights pursuant
to Miranda, and desire to talk to me now concerning this or other matters
of concern to us?" 7 2 The Kenosha, Wisconsin Sheriff and Police Depart-
ments have gone even further, leaving nothing at all to chance. Instead of
asking whether the suspect wishes to waive his rights, the sole "option"
on their written form is actually a firm directive to waive: "I fully under-
stand that I have these rights, I hereby waive said rights and consent to
voluntarily answer questions and make a statement about" the incident.73
In the rare case that an intimidated and overmatched suspect can mus-
ter the wherewithal to attempt to invoke one of his rights, "court deci-
sions have made it extremely difficult . . . to do so. Judges have gone to
extraordinary lengths to classify even seemingly clear invocations as am-
biguous invocations which can be ignored by the police." 74 Stated more
diplomatically, "there remains uncertainty regarding the 'magic words' a
criminal suspect must use to successfully assert" his rights.75
We now know that remaining silent-even when that silence lasts for
hours on end-is no longer enough to actually invoke the right to remain
silent. But thousands of other suspects have affirmatively tried to invoke
69. Hammack, supra note 62, at 435 ("Suspects are generally given no guidance on
how to invoke their rights, and the required warnings certainly do not inform them that
they must do so unambiguously."); Jaime M. Rogers, Note, You Have the Right to Remain
Silent ... Sort of Berghuis v. Thompkins, the Social Costs of a Clear Statement Rule, and
the Need for Amending the Miranda Warnings, 16 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 723, 746
(2011) ("Conspicuously absent from these warnings is any suggestion of the need to in-
voke, never mind unambiguously invoke, one's right to remain silent in order to cut off
questioning . . . .").
70. Hammack, supra note 62, at 434-38 (discussing several police tactics designed to
prevent, and even ignore, suspects' attempts to invoke their rights).
71. Dearborn, supra note 19, at 380.
72. Id. at 380 n.158 (case name in plain text in original).
73. Kenosha, Wis., Police Dep't, Miranda Waiver Form (2012) (on file with author).
The author's viewing of multiple videotaped interrogations also reveals that this written
directive is usually accompanied by the detective's verbal order-which is often no more
than a variation on: "sign here, so you can take this opportunity to help yourself and tell
me your side of the story."
74. Strauss, supra note 61, at 775.
75. Rushin, supra note 43, at 167.
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the right to remain silent by speaking, as is now required, only to fail in
their attempts. 76 For example, one suspect tried to invoke the right by
stating, "I want to give ya'll [sic] a statement but I don't . . . I'd rather not
be doing it. Another time if we could man."77 Unfortunately, the court
found that to be an ambiguous and therefore failed attempt at invoca-
tion.78 Similarly, another suspect responded to a request to talk with
"Naw, I don't think so." 7 9 This polite but clear response did not meet the
court's standards either; the court deemed it insufficient to invoke the
right to silence.80
Even when a suspect is firm, courts will find other disingenuous ways to
label the attempted invocation as inadequate.81 For example, consider
this statement: "I'm not saying shit to you no more, man. You, nothing
personal man, but I don't like you. You're scaring the living shit out of
me . .. .That's it. I shut up."8 2 In cases like this, a court can merely claim
to read the suspect's mind and assume that rather than intending to in-
voke the right to remain silent for the entire interrogation, he was merely
expressing "momentary frustration."8 3 Even when a suspect says, "Get
the f- out of my face. I don't have nothing to say. I refuse to sign [the
waiver form]," 84 he is still not properly invoking the right to remain
silent. 5
Similarly, consider this obviously clear invocation of the right to remain
silent: "You ... ain't listening to what I'm telling you. You don't want to
hear what I'm saying. You want me to admit to something I didn't ... do
... and I got nothin[g] more to say to you. I'm done. This is over." 86
The problem with this statement, the court held, is that while it could be
construed as an attempt to end the interrogation, "it was [also] reasona-
ble for the detectives to conclude that his statement was merely a fencing
mechanism to get a better deal."87 With this disingenuous and fabricated
excuse, the attempted invocation was branded as "equivocal as a matter
of law and [was] therefore insufficient to invoke the right to remain si-
lent."88 Unfortunately, no does not mean no-at least not when the po-
lice are involved.
Likewise, trying to invoke the right to counsel can be an uphill battle.
Questions such as "Do you think I need a lawyer?" will most certainly fail
76. See Strauss, supra note 61, at 787-802.
77. Id. at 789 (quoting State v. Reed, 809 So. 2d 1261, 1273 (La. Ct. App. 2002)).
78. Reed, 809 So. 2d at 1274.
79. People v. Patterson, No. A103263, 2005 WL 2716538, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 21,
2005).
80. Id. at *12.
81. Weisselberg, supra note 18, at 1580.
82. People v. Jennings, 760 P.2d 475, 482 (Cal. 1988).
83. Id. at 483; see also Strauss, supra note 61, at 795.
84. United States v. Banks, 78 F.3d 1190, 1196 n.6 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated by Mills v.
United States, 519 U.S. 990 (1996).
85. United States v. Mills, 122 F.3d 346, 351 (7th Cir. 1997).





to invoke the right. 89 Courts have even held that a direct request, such as
"I can't afford a lawyer but is there anyway [sic] I can get one?" is insuffi-
cient to convey to the police that the suspect would like a lawyer. 90 Inter-
estingly, taking this request for a lawyer out of the interrogation context
demonstrates that the request is, quite obviously, an attempt to invoke
the right to counsel. The following insightful analogy exposes the court's
intellectual dishonesty in holding otherwise:
[I]n everyday parlance, using a question to make a request is com-
monplace. For example, a school child might raise her hand and ask,
"Can I go to the bathroom?" While it is possible that that child does
not really want to go to the bathroom, and may be simply assessing if
it is possible, virtually all would assume that a "yes" answer would
cause the child to leave the room. In other words, it would appear
clear to most that the child is saying, "I want to go to the bathroom-
is that ok?"91
Further, expressions of thought, such as "I think I would like to talk to
a lawyer," will not invoke the right to counsel either.92 The word "think"
turned this sentence from a successful invocation into merely a failed at-
tempt.93 But if that did not doom the suspect's efforts to get a lawyer, the
word "would" may have done so, as it tends to imply a temporal element;
that is, the suspect is not making clear when he would like to talk to a
lawyer.94
Even the direct request "Could I get a lawyer?" is insufficient-even
though the suspect is in custody and would have no way of actually ob-
taining access to the nameless, faceless lawyer the interrogator just prom-
ised him without first asking the interrogator. 95 Consider yet another
suspect's statement to police: "I called a lawyer. He wants-the lawyer
wants to be here before I say anything." 96 This attempted invocation also
fell short. Unfortunately, in the court's eyes, it was not a clear invocation
because it expressed the attorney's desires and not the suspect's. 97 This
ignores the fact that the attorney is the suspect's agent and speaks for
him, just as the police officer is the agent of the state.
Finally, even when a suspect uses the precisely correct set of words-
whatever that might be-courts will find an attempted invocation ambig-
uous based on the manner in which the suspect uttered the words.
"Courts have even gone so far as to hold that a soft-speaking suspect
should know that when an officer speaks in 'a louder voice over him,' his
statement has not been 'clearly conveyed' because the officer could not
89. See Diaz v. Senkowski, 76 F.3d 61, 63-65 (2d Cir. 1996).
90. See Lord v. Duckworth, 29 F.3d 1216, 1218-21 (7th Cir. 1994).
91. Strauss, supra note 61, at 788.
92. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003).
93. Id. at 1070.
94. See Strauss, supra note 61, at 794-95 (discussing "temporally vague comments").
95. United States v. Wesela, 223 F.3d 656, 661-62 (7th Cir. 2000).
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hear it, thus rendering the statement ambiguous."98 Holdings of this na-
ture should be an embarrassment, "as suspects' inability to invoke their
constitutional rights because of the intimidating interrogation environ-
ment is exactly what the Miranda Court sought to prevent."99
However, rather than being embarrassed, courts continually permit the
police to use these tactics to "render virtually any invocation ambiguous
by ignoring it."100 More specifically, when the police continually ignore
multiple attempts at invocation, the suspect will eventually talk to the
police upon realizing that he has no choice.101 Then, the mere fact that
the suspect eventually talked will cast "retrospective doubt" on the valid-
ity of the earlier invocations. 102 The earlier invocations will be declared
ambiguous, thus rendering the suspect's statement admissible. 03
Miranda jurisprudence, as it turns out, would be an excellent tool for
teaching this basic principle of quantum mechanics: "It's a rudimentary
concept that reality is shaped, even created, by our perception." 1 0 4 In the
Miranda context, the interrogating police officer perceives-or, more ac-
curately, claims to perceive-the attempted invocation as ambiguous.
Based on this perception, the court then labels it as such. Perception has
become reality.
E. EASY TO CIRCUMVENT: WHERE THERE'S A WILL THERE'S A WAY
Even though very few suspects can ever successfully invoke their Mi-
randa rights, often despite their best efforts to do so, 105 the potential for
invocation is still a small risk that the police would rather avoid com-
pletely. The reason is that interrogations are a guilt-presumptive pro-
cess.10 6 Many law enforcement officers feel that they have the ability to
know that the suspect is guilty, and then they labor under this presump-
tion-some might say delusion-often ignoring contrary evidence and
doing whatever possible to secure a confession consistent with their pre-
existing views.' 0 7 And "doing whatever possible" includes, but is by no
means limited to, circumventing Miranda. The police "have little interest
98. Hammack, supra note 62, at 433 (quoting United States v. Clark, 746 F. Supp. 2d
176, 186 (D. Me. 2010)).
99. Id. at 439 (case name in plain text in original).
100. Strauss, supra note 61, at 801.
101. Id. at 814-15.
102. Id. at 801.
103. Id.
104. James Lawler, Between Heavens and Hells: The Multidimensional Universe in Kant
and Buffy the Vampire Slayer, reprinted in Buffy the Vampire Slayer and Philosophy: Fear
and Trembling in Sunnydale 105 (James B. South ed., Open Court Publishing 2003) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
105. Strauss, supra note 61, at 822 ("[Tlhe rules for asserting either the right to counsel
or the right to remain silent have become so difficult that almost no one is able to do it.").
106. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 450 (1966) ("The guilt of the subject is to be
posited as a fact.").
107. Interestingly, if the evidence against a suspect were so strong as to justify the inter-
rogator's "knowledge" of the suspect's guilt, then there would be little need for the interro-
gator to obtain a confession. In Miranda-related litigation, however, there is often no
evidence (or little evidence) against the suspect, other than an illegally obtained (and
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in protecting the suspect's right to a knowing and intelligent waiver.
Their objective is to obtain a confession, and therefore it is unlikely that
they will fully inform the suspect of her right[s] . . . or dispel misconcep-
tions about those rights." 08
While the bulk of this Article has addressed the flaws with the warning
that permit the police to circumvent the underlying rights, the simplest
way for them to circumvent the rights is simply to avoid giving the warn-
ing in the first place. The police accomplish this in numerous ways, most
commonly by interrogating first and arresting second.109 This allows
them to take advantage of the inherently coercive nature of the police
station without reading the Miranda warning.110 Since both interrogation
and arrest must occur before the police are required to read the warning:
[O]fficers can bring suspects to the police station for interrogation,
intending to place the suspects under formal arrest later and know-
ing that the suspects actually believe they are in custody. If police
interrogate without warnings, the resulting statements will be admit-
ted if courts-conducting ex post inquiries-conclude that hypotheti-
cal reasonable persons (though not these unreasonable suspects)
would have felt free to leave."1
Another way that the police can avoid giving the warning in the first
place is to arrest, but technically not question, the suspect. This can take
many forms, beginning with the relatively benign practice of arresting
first and hoping that the suspect "volunteers statements upon arrest,"112
or the craftier practice of arresting first and then "discuss[ing] a crime
within earshot of a suspect and then us[ing] any incriminating statements
she makes in response."" 3
If neither of these tactics work, the police can rely on the judge later, in
the courtroom, to legitimize a technique that clearly violates Miranda.
For example, consider McClellan v. State, in which the defendant, who
was accused of forgery and issuing worthless checks, challenged the ad-
missibility of his statement.'1 4 All parties agreed that the defendant was
in custody at the time of the statement; the issue was whether he was
being interrogated or questioned. 15 While sitting with the arrested de-
fendant, a detective decided to engage him "in general shop talk
about"-what else?-"worthless checks and forgeries," the very crimes
sometimes coerced) confession. It is then that this confession, rather than other, objective
evidence, leads to a conviction.
108. Ogletree, supra note 23, at 1828.
109. Weisselberg, supra note 18, at 1540; see, e.g., California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121,
1122 (1983).
110. See Weisselberg, supra note 18, at 1537-38 (discussing the effects of environment
on a suspect's perception of their choices).
111. Id. at 1546.
112. Thompson, supra note 37, at 647.
113. Ogletree, supra note 23, at 1839-40.
114. 193 N.W.2d 711, 726-27 (Wis. 1972).
115. Id. at 728. For the definition of interrogation, see Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.
291, 300-01 (1980) (defining the test as "either express questioning or its functional
equivalent").
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with which the defendant was being charged.116 During the course of this
"shop talk," the detective called the defendant "an amateur," and further
questioned him about his alleged crimes, including asking, "[H]ow did
you do it?"117
Amazingly, the majority of the court held that the defendant's re-
sponses were admissible because the detective really was not questioning
him, so Miranda was not triggered.s18 Instead, the discussion that the
detective instigated was "shop talk," and the defendant's responses to the
detective's (non)questions were "the result of the defendant's 'braggado-
cio.'"119 Of course, the reality, as the court recognized, is that the detec-
tive "not only goaded the defendant into a response, but specifically
asked him . . . 'how did you do it?" 12 0 The detective's supposed "shop
talk" was "calculated to elicit an inculpatory response" and was "success-
ful."1 21 This "constituted a clear violation of the defendant's rights laid
down in Miranda."122
Even when police do read the Miranda warning, "[t]he warnings and
waiver process is so easily manipulated" that Miranda is little more than a
speed bump on their way to obtaining a confession that conforms to their
preconceived version of the case.123 This was demonstrated earlier,
where the police would simply ignore invocations-for example, a sus-
pect's request for a lawyer or a suspect's nearly three-hour attempt to
remain silent-only to have judges later declare that the attempted invo-
cations were ambiguous.
In cases where the police do read suspects the Miranda warning, the
manner in which they read it can help them reach their goal of obtaining
a quick and easy waiver of those rights. For example, "[o]fficers may use
pre-Miranda conversation to build rapport, which is important to ob-
taining a Miranda waiver and-eventually-a statement. Officers may
also downplay the significance of the warning or portray it as a bureau-
cratic step to be satisfied before a conversation may occur." 1 24 This "im-
plies that the warnings do not warrant the suspect's attention."125
After this rapport building and carefully designed minimization of the
importance of the rights, suspects frequently waive those rights. In fact,
after the Miranda decision in 1966, there was no substantial reduction in
the number of suspects who made post-arrest statements.126 Further, sus-
pects-turned-defendants are typically "surprised to learn thereafter that
116. McClellan, 193 N.W.2d at 715.
117. Id. at 715-16.
118. Id. at 717 ("The majority concludes, however, that the statements were volun-
teered and were not the result of custodial interrogation.").
119. Id. at 716.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 717.
122. Id. (case name in plain text in original).
123. Thompson, supra note 37, at 648.
124. Weisselberg, supra note 18, at 1562 (case name in plain text in original).
125. Bazelon, supra note 23, at 1034.
126. Ogletree, supra note 23, at 1827.
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they had a constitutional right to remain silent or to have an attorney
present during questioning."127 This demonstrates just how effective rap-
port building and minimization are at hiding Miranda's message from the
suspects it was intended to protect.
A similar interrogation tactic is to simply contradict the warning's mes-
sage to induce a waiver, rather than an invocation, of the underlying
rights. In an earlier example, the police informed a suspect of his right to
have an attorney present but then immediately told him that there was no
possible way to actually get the attorney. 128 In that case, the police incor-
porated the contradiction into the warning itself, thus making it internally
inconsistent and incomprehensible-yet still, somehow, legally valid.129
The police also have other, more subtle ways to contradict the warning.
For example, if a suspect does not immediately waive his rights after
hearing the warning that "anything said can and will be used against
[him] in court,"130 the police can reverse the warning's cautionary impact
by telling the suspect just the opposite: "that by waiving his rights he will
have a valuable opportunity to tell his version of the story." 131
The problem with telling the suspect that waiving his rights might help
him, however, is that it is false, just as when the police tell a suspect that
his statement may be used "for or against him in a court of law," they are
lying. A suspect's own statement cannot, except in the rarest of circum-
stances, be used in his own defense at trial.132 Even assuming that the
police are speaking generally, rather than specifically about trial, they are
still lying. Despite the popular misconception to the contrary, a suspect
derives no plea-bargaining advantage from confessing. 133 Often, the po-
lice use the inducement that if the defendant cooperates by confessing,
then "the prosecutor will look upon the case differently." 1 3 4 In fact, the
opposite is true: Defendants who confess are more likely to be charged,
convicted, and punished more harshly than their non-confessing
counterparts. 13 5
127. Id.
128. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 198 (1989).
129. Id. at 203-04.
130. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966).
131. Bazelon, supra note 23, at 1035; see also Thompson, supra note 37, at 661 ("[T]he
police may offer suspects benefits in exchange for waivers."). Courts have gone to great
lengths to parse words to rubber-stamp Miranda waivers as free and voluntary. For exam-
ple, in State v. Deets, the court made the following, self-contradictory holding: "An officer
telling a defendant that his cooperation would be to his benefit is not coercive conduct, at
least so long as leniency is not promised." 523 N.W.2d 180, 183 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (em-
phasis added).
132. See supra Part III.B.
133. Dearborn, supra note 19, at 384.
134. Deets, 523 N.W.2d at 183.
135. Dearborn, supra note 19, at 384. In my own experience as a defense lawyer, prose-
cutors do "look upon a case differently" where the defendant (then suspect) confessed.
When recently trying to obtain a favorable plea offer for a client, I informed the prosecutor
that, before I had been retained, the client had fully cooperated with the police and gave
an immediate confession-something that should now be rewarded in plea bargaining.
The prosecutor's response: "Well, that was stupid of him." Conversely, and anecdotally,
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IV. THE BEST SOLUTION (AND WHY IT WON'T WORK)
In light of these glaring deficiencies in the warning and the ways in
which police purposely bypass Miranda's protections, there have been
many recommendations for reform. On one end of the spectrum, many
suggestions are nothing more than academic wonderment and fence-sit-
ting; they are merely scholarly invitations for more debate. This type of
approach to the problem, however, has caused our current chaotic state
of affairs. The courts' failure to take the reins and impose some structure
and clarity has led to today's inadequate Miranda warning. We must
avoid this meandering, impractical approach if we wish to implement true
reform.
On the other end of the spectrum are proposals that are bold and noble
but would require too much fundamental reform of our underlying
rights-something for which our slow-moving legal system is ill-equipped.
Nonetheless, one of these proposals is worth discussing. Several com-
mentators, including former public defender Charles Ogletree and
clinical professor of law Christopher Dearborn, have recommended.
a per se rule prohibiting law enforcement authorities from interro-
gating a suspect in custody who has not consulted with an attorney.
If, after conferring with counsel, a suspect desires to make a state-
ment, it may be used against her. Any statements made without the
assistance of counsel, however, would be inadmissible. 136
This proposed rule should be taken even further to require the assign-
ment of counsel not only before any in-custody interrogations, which can
occur both inside and outside of the police station, but also before all
interrogations that occur at the police station, regardless of whether the
police claim that the suspect was in custody at the time. Without this
additional step, the admissibility of statements will hinge exclusively on
the judge's determination of whether a reasonable person in the suspect's
shoes would have felt free to leave the police station, allowing the same
type of judicial abuses that exist today to persist. 137 In other words,
my clients who do not cooperate with police often enjoy a much more favorable posture
for plea bargaining and, of course, for trial. Therefore, in my experience, prosecutors
mock rather than reward suspects-turned-defendants who were "stupid" enough to cooper-
ate with the police.
136. Ogletree, supra note 23, at 1830; see also Dearborn, supra note 19, at 363.
137. One of the more ridiculous court findings with regard to whether a defendant was
in custody can be found in State v. Farias-Mendoza, 2006 WI App 134, 720 N.W.2d 489.
There, the trial court admitted that the defendant was "held in a locked interview room in
the station for as long as five hours and twenty minutes." Id. [ 18. Normally, of course,
actual custody should be enough to find that the suspect was, in fact, in custody. However,
this trial court stated that the nearly six-hour detention in a locked room "was the only
factor that weighed in favor of a conclusion that [the defendant] was under arrest." Id.
The trial court concluded that, other than being locked away for nearly six hours, there was
nothing that "the defendant might have misperceived as an effort by the State to restrain
him. I think a reasonable person in the defendant's position . . . would have thought that
the police were being impolite but not that he was under arrest." Id. at 495. This, unfortu-
nately, is the type of shameful, results-oriented nonsense that often poses as reasoning at
the trial court level. In many cases, appellate courts will rubber-stamp the trial court's
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slightly expanding this proposal would eliminate the police tactic of inter-
rogating first and arresting second, which would prevent the police from
bypassing this proposed, earlier-attaching right to counsel by claiming
that the suspect was not in custody.
This proposed reform is unquestionably reasonable and would be a
well-deserved outcome for the police, prosecutors, and judges who have
abused, and all but obliterated, Miranda's protections over the past forty-
plus years. After all, how much misconduct can we citizens tolerate
before we take steps to limit the overly broad power and discretion that
we have vested in these government agents? The irony of this reform
would be that the police, with the help of judges, would have brought the
change on themselves. Much like the aristocracy in the French Revolu-
tion, they would have "dug their own graves."138
In addition to being reasonable and logical, this proposed reform also
finds support in the Constitution. Courts should "rely on the Sixth
Amendment and conclude that the right to counsel should attach as soon
as practicable following arrest, but no later than prior to any custodial
interrogation." 13 9 In the context of this framework, the term "custodial
interrogation" should be defined to include all interrogations at the po-
lice station, regardless of the interrogator's or judge's opinion about
whether the suspect was actually in custody. "In other words, the only
way to truly actualize the limited right to counsel in the Fifth Amendment
context is for the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to attach the mo-
ment Miranda warnings are required." 140 This reasoning is sound, given
that the Sixth Amendment's purpose is "'protecting the unaided layman
at critical confrontations with his adversary,' by giving him 'the right to
rely on counsel as a "medium" between him and the State."1 41
Unfortunately, although well-rooted in logic and the theory and policy
of the Sixth Amendment, such reform is unlikely, as it would require
swimming upstream against long-standing, substantive law. This reform
is well ahead of its time and is still too revolutionary, just as it was when
Charles Ogletree proposed it in 1987. In short, it would require more
substantive change than our entrenched and snail-paced system of justice
can currently accommodate.
decision. Here, however, the trial court's ruling was so disingenuous that the appellate
court was forced to conclude that actual custody was sufficient to establish that the defen-
dant was, in fact, in custody. Id. at 491. However, our U.S. Supreme Court is not as rea-
sonable and has held that even when a suspect is locked up and serving a jail sentence,
there is not "custody" for Miranda purposes unless there is "custody within custody."
Howes v. Fields, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 1194 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
138. Paul Campos, The Revolution Will Not Be Cite Checked, INSIDE THE LAw SCHOOL
SCAM BLOG (May 18, 2012, 8:19 AM), http://insidethelawschoolscam.blogspot.com/search?
q=this+revolution+will+not+be+cite+checked (arguing, in a different context, that today's
law school faculties, much like the pre-revolution French aristocracy, will have brought
their coming troubles on themselves through years of excess and abuse).
139. Dearborn, supra note 19, at 363.
140. Id. (case name in plain text in original).
141. Id. at 389 (footnote omitted) (quoting Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 631-32
(1986)).
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This Article, therefore, advocates for a more moderate reform: rewrit-
ing the Miranda warning to more accurately and clearly express the ex-
isting, underlying Miranda rights. This proposed reform requires an
easily implemented change only in the warning, and not in the substan-
tive, underlying constitutional protections.
V. REWRITING THE WARNING
A. MEANS OF REFORM
The means by which the Miranda warning can be revamped are numer-
ous. While the substantive, underlying rights are a matter for the Su-
preme Court-or for the individual state supreme courts, if they decide to
give their citizens greater protection under their state constitutions-the
warning itself can be changed in at least three different procedural ways.
First, the Supreme Court-or, again, the individual state supreme
courts-can mandate a specific warning.142 Second, the state "legisla-
tures could codify new warnings to replace the current ones."1 43 And
third, individual law enforcement agencies can require (and in some cases
have required) a specific warning.144
The only constitutional requirement is that the warning is at least as
informative as the weakest version currently approved by the Supreme
Court.14 5 However, as this Article demonstrates, complying with the Su-
preme Court's bare minimum standard is an easy task. The Court poses
virtually no hurdle, as it will rubber-stamp virtually any imaginable cob-
bled-together collection of words. 146
B. OBJECTIVES OF REFORM
The objectives of the new Miranda warning mirror the problems with
the existing warning that were discussed in Part III. First, the new warn-
142. Hammack, supra note 62, at 443. However, given the Supreme Court's and the
lower courts' historical aversion to any level of form, structure, and consistency, it is un-
likely that any meaningful reform will be implemented at this level of government. See
Weisselberg, supra note 18, at 1593 ("I do not see any appetite on the Court for engaging in
a wholesale revision of the Miranda doctrine[.]" (case name in plain text in original)).
143. Austin Steelman, Note, Miranda's Great Mirage: How Protections Against Wide-
spread Findings of Implied Waiver Have Been Lost on the Horizon, 80 UMKC L. REv. 239,
253 (2011). Even the Miranda Court anticipated legislative action. Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 490 (1966) ("Congress and the States are free to develop their own safe-
guards for the privilege, so long as they are fully as effective as those described above in
informing accused persons of their right of silence and in affording a continuous opportu-
nity to exercise it.").
144. Rogers, supra note 69, at 749 ("[P]olice departments could promulgate rules incor-
porating the proposed amendment."). Although it seems unlikely that law enforcement
agencies would do anything to cure the defective warnings from which they so greatly
benefit, it is still possible. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 483 (discussing the FBI's "exemplary
record of effective law enforcement while advising any suspect or arrested person" of his
Fifth Amendment rights, even before being required to do so under Miranda).
145. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 490 (permitting lower courts, legislatures, and even law en-
forcement agencies to develop their own Miranda warnings, provided they are at least "as
effective as those described" by the Court).
146. See supra Part II.
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ing must be easily understood. This means that it must be written in plain
English and must be internally consistent, rather than self-contradic-
tory.147 For example, the warning must not inform a suspect: (1) that he
is going to be interrogated; (2) that he has the right to an attorney before
being interrogated; but then (3) that there is no way that he can actually
get the attorney before being interrogated. 1 4 8 As demonstrated earlier,
the Court's attempt to interpret this self-contradictory warning produced
a 5-4 split among the Justices-surely it would be incomprehensible to
the typical criminal suspect.149
Second, the new Miranda warning must be accurate; that is, it should
not misstate the nature of the rights it is designed to convey. 150 For ex-
ample, the new warning should not inform a suspect that he has the literal
right to remain silent because, under existing law, he must now affirma-
tively speak to invoke this right. 151 As another example, the new warning
should not imply that the suspect can immediately consult with an attor-
ney because he clearly does not have that right either.152 Rather, his only
immediate right is the right to affirmatively state that he does not wish to
answer questions about the incidentl 53-a right that is not the equivalent
of remaining silent and, further, is the opposite of consulting with an at-
torney and then answering questions.
Third, the new Miranda warning should be complete. It should not
omit material information that would be important for a suspect to make
an informed decision about whether to exercise his rights.154 For exam-
ple, while law enforcement officials currently tell suspects that anything
they say can be used against them in court (which, actually, is false, as the
post-Miranda request for an attorney is generally not admissible), they
should also be told that their refusal to answer questions cannot be used
against them in court.15 5 Providing suspects with complete and relevant
information about the consequences of their choices is a necessity. 156
Fourth, the new Miranda warning must include instructions on how to
actually invoke the underlying rights.157 The importance of this is best
demonstrated in the context of the right to silence. We now know that,
counterintuitively, a suspect cannot invoke the right to silence by simply
remaining silent.158 Additionally, when suspects try to affirmatively in-
voke the right to silence, the police repeatedly "play dumb" by refusing
147. See supra Part III.A.
148. See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 198 (1989).
149. See id. at 196.
150. See supra Part III.B.
151. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010).
152. See Dearborn, supra note 19, at 359.
153. See id.
154. See supra Part III.C.
155. See Rushin, supra note 43, at 153.
156. See id.
157. See supra Part III.D.
158. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010).
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to accept clear invocations such as "I'm not saying shit to you"159 or "This
is over." 16 0 Then, when defendants later challenge the admissibility of
their subsequent statements, the courts will label their earlier invocations
as mere attempted invocations.161 But if the courts are going to be this
hypertechnical about how a suspect can actually invoke the right to si-
lence, then, at the very least, the police must tell the suspect upfront ex-
actly how he must invoke the right.162
Finally, the new Miranda warning must be designed so that the police
are required to read, rather than evade, the warning and are further pre-
vented from ignoring suspects' invocations of their underlying rights.163
The police must also be prevented from minimizing the warnings 64 or
contradicting the warnings1 65 in order to induce a waiver of rights.
C. TIERED STRUCTURE: TIMING Is EVERYTHING
Regarding the incomprehensibility of many of the current iterations of
Miranda: "Worst of all are the warnings that are long, complex, and ob-
scure a suspect's Miranda rights."1 66 Therefore, the new Miranda warn-
ing must be easily understood, which probably requires that it be the
opposite of long and complex, which is short and simple. On the other
hand, the new warning must also be complete; it must convey all of the
relevant rights.
While these two objectives appear incompatible, they are actually eas-
ily reconciled. The solution to the problem is found in a case discussed
earlier, where the court held that a suspect need not be informed of his
right to stop answering questions if he first decides to speak.167 The
court's reasoning was that "[t]he right to stop answering questions sur-
faces, not at the warnings stage of the Miranda safeguards, but rather
subsequent thereto."168
Although the court's ultimate holding was wrong because a right sur-
facing mid-interrogation rather than pre-interrogation cannot justify ex-
cluding it from the warnings, its observation is correct: Different rights
are relevant at different stages of the suspect-police encounter. 169 Fur-
ther, some rights are even contingent on the exercise or waiver of other
rights. In this particular case, the right to stop answering questions once
questioning has begun cannot possibly become an issue until the suspect
has decided to waive his right to silence in the first place. As another
159. People v. Jennings, 760 P.2d 475, 482 (Cal. 1988).
160. State v. Saeger, 2010 WI App 135U, 3, 329 Wis. 2d 711, 790 N.W.2d 543.
161. Strauss, supra note 61, at 775.
162. See Rushin, supra note 43, at 170.
163. See supra Part tII.E.
164. See Weisselberg, supra note 18, at 1562.
165. See Bazelon, supra note 23, at 1035.
166. Rosales, supra note 27, at 123 (case name in plain text in original).
167. State v. Mitchell, 482 N.W.2d 364, 371 (Wis. 1992).
168. Id. at 372.
169. See id.; see also Rogers, supra note 69, at 729-30 (discussing the various Miranda
rights as superordinate and subordinate).
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example, the right to have an attorney present during questioning is a
moot point if the suspect decides to invoke his right to silence. 170
With all of these different rights, some of which become relevant at
different points in time and may even be contingent on the exercise or
waiver of other rights, it is very unlikely that a suspect will be able to
absorb, process, and make informed decisions about whether to invoke
some or all of these rights. This is especially true given the specifically
designed, psychologically intimidating setting of the interrogation
room. 171 Therefore, the solution is to tier the presentation of the new
Miranda warning so that it conveys the various rights in a layered format.
This way, the rights are presented to the suspect when they are relevant,
rather than all at once.
VI. THE NEW MIRANDA WARNING
The new Miranda warning (below) is written in clear and simple lan-
guage and is delivered in a three-part, tiered fashion.
To defeat the various police tactics and judicial abuses discussed in this
Article, the warning must be delivered whenever the suspect is arrested,
regardless of where that arrest takes place or whether the police intend to
"question" the suspect, engage the suspect in "shop talk," or otherwise
"communicate" with the suspect in any way. This should prevent the po-
lice from escaping Miranda by labeling their questions as "shop talk" or
some other benign-sounding phrase. 172
Also, to defeat the "question first and arrest second" tactic, the warn-
ing must be delivered whenever the suspect is questioned at the police
station or in a police vehicle, even if the police claim the suspect was
there voluntarily and was not in police custody.173
Here is the new Miranda warning, in its three-part, tiered format:
A. PART ONE
[Because the rights are contingent in nature, the reading of the rights
might well stop after this first form, depending on whether the suspect
decides to invoke the right to remain silent.]
170. Rogers, supra note 69, at 729-30.
171. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,448-50 (1966) (discussing interrogation manuals
that instruct police to use multiple psychological tactics, including interrogating the suspect
away from his familiar surroundings so that he is not "confident" and is less "keenly aware
of his rights").
172. See McClellan v. State, 193 N.W.2d 711, 715 (Wis. 1972); see also Ogletree, supra
note 23, at 1839-40 (discussing the police tactic of discussing "a crime within earshot of a
suspect" in hopes of receiving an incriminating response without first asking formal
questions).
173. Weisselberg, supra note 18, at 1541 (describing how courts construe the test for
custody very narrowly, thus permitting "stationhouse interrogations without Miranda
warnings in a police-dominated atmosphere" (case name set in plain text in original)).
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Miranda Warning-Form I
You have been arrested for [name of alleged crime]. You will be held in
jail until you are brought before a judge on [date and time]. The judge
will decide whether to set your bail or release you without setting bail.
I would like to ask you questions about [describe allegation]. Before I
ask you questions, however, I need to inform you of some very important
rights that you have.
First, you have the right to remain silent.
If you decide to talk to me, anything you say can be used against you in
court.
However, if you decide to remain silent, your silence cannot be used
against you in any way.
If you know that you want to remain silent, I will stop the interrogation
now. But if you want to talk to me or if you are not sure whether you
want to talk to me, I will tell you about some additional rights that you
have before you make your decision.
Suspect should check only one box:
I want to remain silent, and I understand that my silence cannot be
used against me in any way.
OR
I might want to talk to you and answer your questions. Please tell me
more information about my other rights before I decide.
Instructions to interrogator:
If the suspect checked the first box and elected to remain silent, end
the interrogation now. If the suspect checked the second box, proceed to
the next form to explain additional Miranda rights.
The first part of this first form-advising a suspect that he is in custody,
telling him when he will be brought to court, and informing him that the
judge will decide whether to set bail or release him without bail-is criti-
cal. 17 4 As commentators and the dissenters on the Court have observed,
if these questions are left unanswered, suspects may reasonably think that
their decision to talk somehow favorably affects their release date or bail
amount.' 7 5 It is also important to tell suspects upfront the topic of discus-
174. This portion of the Miranda warning does not precisely fit the rare situation where
the police "invite" a suspect to the police station to give a statement but truly have no
intention of arresting him. They may, for example, intend to obtain the incriminating
statement so the prosecutor's office can charge the suspect via summons and complaint at a
later date. However, this does not change the inherently intimidating nature of the police
station, the long history of law enforcement's abuse of Miranda, the possibility of the inter-
rogator changing his mind and arresting the suspect after hearing what he says, or the need
for this warning. The police must still read the warning, and, if the suspect chooses to make
a statement, the police could simply release him afterwards, despite their earlier warning
that he was under arrest.
175. Altman, supra note 16, at 1101 (arguing that without such a warning, "suspects
might feel compelled to answer questions in order to avoid this imprisonment").
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sion, which will prevent the police from using their highly effective bait-
and-switch tactics. 7 6
Telling the suspect that the rights are "very important" will alert him
that these are not mere bureaucratic formalities, but instead are worthy
of his full attention.177 For this same reason, it is critical to require the
police to present the form in writing' 78 and to read it verbatim. 179 As
demonstrated earlier, any "supplementing" of the form with additional
(mis)information could easily defeat Miranda's purpose. Further, taking
away the creative liberties of the police by requiring a verbatim reading is
not overly burdensome. In fact, many police officers already read from
pre-printed forms and have easy access to them, especially at the police
station where nearly all in-custody interrogations take place. While re-
fraining from additional, often contradictory, commentary is a bit more
challenging for the police, they are capable of such restraint-especially
with the threat of suppression looming over their heads.
The heart of this form then advises the suspect of his right to remain
silent180 and that anything he says can be used against him-not for
him-in court. 181 Just as importantly, however, it also advises the suspect
that his silence cannot be used against him in any way.182 This provides
full information about the consequences of the suspect's decision and
thwarts any implication that talking can somehow be to the suspect's ben-
176. Ogletree, supra note 23, at 1841 (discussing police tactic of obtaining waiver for
one matter, and then questioning suspect about a more serious matter); Weisselberg, supra
note 18, at 1564 ("Police do not have to tell a suspect the subject matter of an investigation
177. Godsey, supra note 46, at 813 (arguing for the adoption of a Miranda warning that
begins with the statement: "You have a number of important constitutional rights that
protect you when law enforcement officers ask questions of you."); Weisselberg, supra note
18, at 1562 (discussing the police tactic of minimizing the importance of the warning to
induce waiver).
178. Godsey, supra note 46, at 807 (arguing for requirement of a written waiver before
questioning).
179. Bazelon, supra note 23, at 1039 (arguing that "all criminal suspects across the
country [should] receive the same warnings"); Croxall, supra note 23, at 1026 (arguing for a
"uniform specific warning"); Strauss, supra note 61, at 823 ("[A] police officer should be
required to have a set script and would not be able to use the opportunity to editorialize on
the benefits of talking to the police.").
180. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966).
181. Id. at 469.
182. Godsey, supra note 46, at 783-84 (arguing for a warning stating that "[i]f you
choose to remain silent, your silence will not be used against you as evidence to suggest
that you committed a crime simply because you refused to speak" (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Hammack, supra note 62, at 451 (discussing the invocation of the right to
silence both immediately and after first speaking and arguing that "a statement explaining
when silence can and cannot be used against a suspect at trial could be added to the cur-
rent warnings"); Rogers, supra note 69, at 748 (arguing for a warning stating that "if you
say you do not want to speak with us . .. we will not be able to use that against you in
court"); Strauss, supra note 61, at 823 (arguing for a warning stating that "[i]f you decide to
ask for an attorney or to stay quiet, that choice will not be used against you in any way"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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efit or that not talking can be to his detriment.1 s3
This form also tells the suspect what will happen if he chooses to re-
main silent: The interrogation will end. 184 It then instructs him precisely
how to affirmatively invoke the right: Check the box.'8 5 Importantly, this
form provides the suspect with a true choice, unlike many police forms
that provide only a directive to sign and waive the rights with no alterna-
tive.18 6 Instructing the suspect on exactly how to invoke the right accom-
plishes three additional things: (1) it informs the suspect that he cannot
just remain silent, but rather must communicate that choice;' 8 7 (2) it pre-
vents the police from deterring the suspect's invocation by yelling at or
talking over him;188 and (3) it prevents the police from claiming that the
suspect's attempted invocation was ambiguous.18 9
Part One of the new Miranda warning focuses on, and stops with, the
first of the Miranda rights. This tiered structure puts the spotlight
squarely on the only relevant topic at this point in the suspect-police en-
counter: the right to remain silent. If the suspect chooses to invoke this
right, then the other rights do not apply. There is no reason to inform
him of his right to stop answering questions because he has just elected
not to start answering questions. He will be informed of his right to an
attorney, and may even be appointed an attorney, when he is brought to
court, and there is no need to inform him of his right to have an attorney
present at an interrogation in which he just declined to partake. Further,
by ignoring these presently irrelevant rights, we avoid using a warning
"that [is] long, complex, and obscure[s]" the right to remain silent.190
B. PART Two
If after the interrogator reads the first form the suspect either wants to
answer questions or is unsure whether he wants to do so, then the interro-
gator can proceed and must read the next form.
Miranda Warning-Form 2
I will now inform you about additional rights that you have.
You have the right to an attorney.
183. Godsey, supra note 46, at 802 ("[I]f it is essential that suspects know the conse-
quences of speaking, then it is equally essential, if not more so, that they also know that no
formal consequences will follow from their silence . . . .").
184. Rogers, supra note 69, at 748 (arguing for a warning stating that "if you say that
you do not want to speak with us, we will stop questioning you").
185. Hammack, supra note 62, at 435 ("Suspects are generally given no guidance on
how to invoke their rights .... ).
186. See, e.g., Kenosha, Wis., Police Dep't, Miranda Waiver Form (2012) (stating "I
fully understand that I have these rights, I hereby waive said rights and consent to volunta-
rily answer questions and make a statement about" the incident) (on file with author).
187. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010).
188. See Hammack, supra note 62, at 433 (discussing police tactic of yelling over the
suspect to prevent suspect from invoking rights).
189. See Strauss, supra note 61, at 801-02.
190. Rosales, supra note 27, at 123.
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If you cannot afford an attorney, the judge will give you one for free
when you go to court on [date and time].
You have the right to consult with your attorney before you decide
whether you want to talk to me.
If you consult with your attorney and decide to talk to me, you have
the right to have your attorney with you when you talk to me.
Suspect should check only one box:
Knowing these additional rights, I want to remain silent, and I under-
stand that my silence cannot be used against me in any way.
OR
I understand these additional rights, but I want to talk to you and an-
swer your questions now, without an attorney.
Instructions to interrogator:
If the suspect checked the first box and elected to remain silent, end
the interrogation now. If the suspect checked the second box, proceed to
the next form.
Because the suspect did not invoke the right to silence after reading the
first form, the information in Form Two becomes relevant. It informs the
suspect of all aspects of the right to counsel-the right to counsel itself,
the right to court-appointed counsel for the indigent, and the right to con-
sult with counsel before and during any statements to police' 91-and then
gives the suspect the actual option of remaining silent or talking to the
police, rather than a directive to waive the right and speak.192
Importantly, this form does not state, or even imply, that this is the
suspect's last chance to talk to police or, conversely, that if he chooses to
talk to the police an attorney will be made available on the spot. The
police have no way of providing counsel prior to or during the interroga-
tion, nor are they obligated to do so. 1 9 3 This form is therefore both com-
plete and accurate with regard to the underlying rights and procedure.
C. PART THREE
If after the interrogator reads the second form the suspect decides to
talk to law enforcement and answer questions, the interrogator would
then proceed to the next form, which includes a written waiver of rights.
Miranda Warning-Form 3
You have told me that you want to give up certain rights and talk to
me. I will need you to sign and fill in the information below before we
get started.
The rights that you are giving up by talking to me are:
191. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-70 (1966).
192. See Kenosha, Wis., Police Dep't, Miranda Waiver Form (2012) (on file with au-
thor) (providing only an option to waive, but not to invoke, the Miranda rights).
193. Godsey, supra note 46, at 803 (arguing for the elimination of the current right to
counsel warnings in their entirety because, contrary to the warnings' promises, suspects are
not provided with counsel before or during interrogation; instead, "[tihe right to counsel
warnings act in practice as a restatement of the right to remain silent in a different form").
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The right to remain silent. Again, if you decide to remain silent, that
cannot be used against you.
The right to consult with an attorney before and during questioning.
Waiver of Rights:
I have decided to talk to you about [describe allegation].
I understand that anything I say can be used against me in court.
Finally, I also understand that I can change my mind and stop this in-
terrogation at any time by telling you "I want to stop answering
questions."
[Sign, date, and time here]
This form recaps the rights the suspect is giving up, reminds him that
anything he says can be used against him, and documents the waiver in
writing.19 4 Most significantly, it informs the suspect of the last of the Mi-
randa warnings: the right to stop talking at any time. 19 5 Finally, it also
provides the exact phrasing necessary to do so.
VII. JUST THE BEGINNING: OTHER
MIRANDA-RELATED ISSUES
To avoid becoming a treatise on Miranda, this Article is limited to the
Miranda warning rather than Miranda's substantive, underlying rights.
Additionally, this Article has (thus far) ignored several other Miranda-
related issues, some of which would have to be addressed along with re-
writing the warning if reform is to be meaningful.
First, virtually nothing in this Article will be of any value if the police
are not required to video record the Miranda reading and, if the rights
are waived, the subsequent interrogation. 1 9 6 Without a video recording,
the police could simply defeat the new Miranda warning by contradicting
it and promising leniency to suspects in exchange for their waiver of
rights. Fortunately, widely available, low-cost technology permits easy
video recording by any law enforcement agency, and several states now
even require video recording.197
Second, unless there is adequate incentive for police to actually deliver
the new Miranda warning and honor any subsequent invocation of rights,
nothing in this Article will alter the status quo. Currently, the police have
no incentive to comply with even the Court's existing, anemic Miranda
194. Id. at 807 (arguing for requirement of a written waiver before questioning).
195. Hammack, supra note 62, at 449-50 (arguing that an instruction "regarding how a
suspect may invoke his right to remain silent post-waiver could be added to inform him
that he must clearly state his desire to rely on his rights").
196. Jung, supra note 20, at 457 (arguing that "a recordation requirement" would "pose
only a mild inconvenience and would vastly increase confidence in the interrogation re-
sult"); Romano, supra note 20, at 542 (arguing that "Miranda rights are violated constantly
during interrogation, and the defense can seldom win the argument when going against a
police officer's word" (case name in plain text in original)).
197. Godsey, supra note 46, at 809 ("[S]everal states have adopted this requirement
through legislation or court decision, and many more states are currently considering bills
mandating taped interrogations." (footnote omitted)).
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safeguards. If the police cannot quickly induce a legitimate waiver of the
rights, they are always better off coercing a waiver than honoring the Mi-
randa invocation. The reason is that even if a court finds the statement
was obtained in violation of Miranda-a very rare occurrence indeed-
the statement is still admissible as rebuttal evidence.198 Further, the
statement may lead to additional physical evidence, which can also be
admissible. 199
In other words, the police are always better off if they obtain a state-
ment in violation of Miranda, rather than honoring the Miranda invoca-
tion and obtaining no statement. Until this changes and proper
deterrents are put in place-for example, suppression of the statement
and derivative evidence for all purposes, if not dismissal of the case-
then no Miranda warning, no matter how well drafted, will completely
protect a suspect's Fifth Amendment rights in every situation.
Finally, some other relevant issues beyond the scope of this Article in-
clude the development of: (1) special procedures for the interrogation of
juveniles, mentally impaired suspects, and suspects who speak little or no
English; (2) meaningful safeguards ensuring the suppression of involun-
tary statements, even when the initial Miranda waiver was voluntary; and
(3) rational rules for the treatment of pre-Miranda silence. Indeed, al-
though adopting the new Miranda warning would be tremendous pro-
gress in and of itself, if reform is to be complete it must by necessity
extend beyond rewriting the warning.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Miranda already has one foot in the grave. Not only have Miranda's
underlying rights been decimated-for example, a suspect now waives his
right to remain silent by remaining silent-but the Miranda warning is an
unmitigated disaster.
First, there is no standardization, as courts have rubber-stamped nearly
every set of words cobbled together by law enforcement, no matter how
defective they are in conveying Miranda's message. 200 The least of the
problems associated with this lack of standardization is that the ensuing
chaos has led to a mind-boggling amount of costly, court-clogging
litigation.201
Second, and more significantly, even the best versions of the Miranda
warning are incomprehensible, fail to accurately and completely convey
Miranda's underlying rights, and offer no way of actually invoking those
198. See Thompson, supra note 37, at 646 (discussing multiple exceptions to the exclu-
sionary rule).
199. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 643-44 (2004) (holding, in a plurality
decision, that a failure to give Miranda warnings does not require suppression of the "phys-
ical fruit" of the suspect's statements). But see State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, 1 81-83, 285
Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899, 921 (providing greater protection under the Wisconsin Consti-
tution and suppressing physical evidence obtained as a result of a Miranda violation).
200. See supra Part II.
201. See supra Part II.
940 [Vol. 65
The New Miranda Warning
rights. 202 And, as an initial matter, the warnings themselves allow for
incredibly easy circumvention by the police.203
The best solution to this state of affairs would be to require the ap-
pointment of defense counsel prior to any interrogation, which would be
just deserts for the police and courts that have decimated Miranda over
the past forty-plus years.20 However, such a solution is too impractical
and defendant-oriented for the courts to implement. 205 Instead, the most
practical reform is to rewrite the Miranda warning so that it is standard-
ized, easily understood by suspects, and accurately and completely con-
veys Miranda's underlying rights.206 Further, it must provide a means by
which a suspect can actually invoke the underlying rights, and it simply
cannot allow for easy circumvention by the police.2 0 7
Because drafting a Miranda warning that is complete could result in a
lengthy warning that is incomprehensible; the only way to accomplish
these potentially conflicting objectives is to tier the delivery of the warn-
ing.208 This is done by recognizing the contingent nature of the rights-
for example, the right to stop answering questions is only relevant if the
suspect chooses to waive his right to remain silent and start answering
questions in the first place-and then explaining the rights accordingly.209
In light of the contingent and staggered nature of the Miranda rights,
the first portion of the Miranda warning must advise the suspect of the
right to remain silent and the consequences of speaking, and must also
inform the suspect that if he chooses to remain silent, his choice cannot
be used against him in any way.210 Only if the suspect is interested in
waiving the right to remain silent do the other rights become relevant.
Therefore, the second portion of the warning, if needed, advises the sus-
pect of all aspects of the right to counsel.211 Finally, if the suspect
chooses to waive all rights and make a statement, he must then be in-
formed of the remaining right: the right to stop answering questions at
any time.212 At each stage of the Miranda warning presentation, the po-
lice must give the suspect a real choice between waiving and invoking the
various rights and must record that choice in writing.213
Rewriting the Miranda warning so that it clearly, accurately, and com-
pletely conveys Miranda's underlying rights, while giving the suspect a
meaningful choice and clear means to invoke those rights, is a critical first
step in keeping Miranda alive.
202. See supra Parts III.A.-III.D.
203. See supra Part III.E.
204. See supra Part IV.
205. See supra Part IV.
206. See supra Part V.B.
207. See supra Part V.B.
208. See supra Part V.C.
209. See supra Part V.C.
210. See supra Part VI.A.
211. See supra Part VI.B.
212. See supra Part VI.C.
213. See supra Parts VI.A.-VI.B.
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